ABSTRACT In a profile matchmaking application of mobile social networks, users need to reveal their interests to each other in order to find the common interests. A malicious user may harm a user by knowing his personal information. Therefore, mutual interests need to be found in a privacy preserving manner. In this paper, we propose an efficient privacy protection and interests sharing protocol referred to as PRivacy-aware Interest Sharing and Matching (PRISM). PRISM enables users to discover mutual interests without revealing their interests. Unlike existing approaches, PRISM does not require revealing the interests to a trusted server. Moreover, the protocol considers attacking scenarios that have not been addressed previously and provides an efficient solution. The inherent mechanism reveals any cheating attempt by a malicious user. PRISM also proposes the procedure to eliminate Sybil attacks. We analyze the security of PRISM against both passive and active attacks. Through implementation, we also present a detailed analysis of the performance of PRISM and compare it with existing approaches. The results show the effectiveness of PRISM without any significant performance degradation.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the growth of mobile devices and online social networks (OSNs), people can connect with each other ubiquitously anytime. Mobile Social Networks (MSNs) are the emerging trend in mobile technology that combine wireless communication and social networking. MSN inherits advantages of delay tolerant networks (DTNs) and opportunistic networks (Opp-nets) [1] . The main purpose of this paradigm is to provide users with services like locationaware services, group texter services, matchmaking services, media sharing services, social gaming, social courier (just to name a few) [1] , [21] . One of the popular applications of MSN is profile matchmaking. There are many beneficial application of MSN, where matchmaking can help users to improve themselves, for example in their social life, in finding people with common hobbies and even in health issues. While this is a useful way of finding common interests, matchmaking needs to address a few issues as well.
During the matchmaking, a user needs to show his/her interests to other users in order to match their common interests. However, there are various scenarios in which a user may not want to disclose all of his/her interests to other user unless there is the surety that other user have the same interests. Consider a scenario where a patient in a hospital wishes to find someone with the same disease or symptoms he/she is himself suffering from. However, the patient does not want to reveal his disease to anyone else. This kind of scenario makes matchmaking a tricky thing to perform among privacy conscious users. By revealing their private information without a privacy preserving matching mechanism, users put themselves at risk both offline (e.g. stalking) and online (e.g. identity theft). Therefore, the concerns as mentioned in [2] and [3] should be considered when developing a matchmaking application.
In this paper, we present a protocol named as PRISM (PRivacy-aware Interest Sharing and Matching) that securely matches the private information of two users. Our objective is to improve the existing matchmaking protocols and help mobile users to securely perform matchmaking without revealing unnecessary information. The main contributions of our paper are as follows:
• PRISM provides a secure and privacy preserving mechanism in order to find mutual interests of users.
• The paper discusses unaddressed attacks on user privacy and provides effective means to prevent these attacks. These include attacks during the interests matching and interest revealing phases.
• We suggest a mechanism that aims to provide protection against Sybil attacks by limiting a user to at most one device.
• Unlike existing approaches, the trust assumptions on trusted third party (TTP) are significantly reduced by not revealing user interests to the TTP.
• The implementation of PRISM and subsequent comparison with existing approaches show that PRISM provides better protection against various attacks without any significant degradation in performance. The paper is further organized as follows. Section II highlights the related work and its limitations. Section III gives preliminaries including attack model, design goals, system model, assumptions, notations and cryptographic tool. Then, Section IV presents the proposed PRISM protocol, followed by security analysis and performance evaluation in Section V and Section VI, respectively. Finally, Section VII concludes the paper with future work.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, various existing profile matchmaking approaches have been discussed. This literature discussed these approaches with two different perspectives. Firstly, it categorizes the profile matchmaking approaches with an architectural/deployment point of view. Secondly, it discusses various approaches with respect to their implementation of matchmaking computation mechanism.
Profile matchmaking approaches can be broadly divided into distributed, centralized and hybrid approaches. In distributed approach, users broadcast their profile information like in MobiClique [4] , in which profile information is downloaded from Facebook to user's device and then broadcasted to nearby Bluetooth devices. After that, the profile matchmaking protocol is executed in order to find the common interests. The drawback in this approach is that a user's information is at its risk and any malicious user can get private information of the user. In centralized approach, a server acts as a trusted third party (TTP) among participants. The server has interests of all the participants and performs the matchmaking. For example, looptmix [5] and Gatsby [6] are two approaches in which a server tracks users' locations, saves information into its database and then performs matchmaking. Social serendipity [7] also deploys a trusted server that contains users' profiles and user-defined matchmaking preferences. Smokescreen [8] and SMILE [9] use encounter information but matchmaking is done on centralized server. PeopleTones [10] and Just-For-Us [11] are proximity based friend finding schemes that rely on central server. Centralized architectures are easy to deploy but are considered a potential candidate for a single point of failure. Moreover, because the trusted server has users' locations and personal information, in case of a compromise, whole system may suffer. In hybrid approaches [15] , [16] , TTP server is used only for verification and information management but it does not take part in the matchmaking phase. The matchmaking is performed through protocols running on a user's device. The benefit of using hybrid approach is that a verification authority is responsible to authenticate legitimate users and preventing them from a malicious user. However, to prevent the system becoming a single point of failure, as well as reducing the burden of calculations, most of the matchmaking protocol execution is done on user's device.
Another aspect to classify profile matchmaking protocol is the way matchmaking is performed. Matchmaking protocols can also be described as a private set intersection (PSI) problem or a private cardinality of set intersection (PCSI) problem [12] - [14] . Private set intersection (PSI) deals with finding common objects blindly. The term emerged from set theory where intersection operation is used to find common elements in two sets. Private cardinality of set intersection (PCSI) only provides the number of matched elements. Commutative encryption based protocols have been used to solve PSI and PCSI problems. In [14] , authors use a commutative encryption function for private set intersection problems. Authors suggest a power function f e (x) = x e modp, as an example of a commutative function. The security of their protocol is based on the Decisional Diffie-Hellman Hypothesis (DDH). However, this approach lacks in providing protection against a malicious user who may cheat by reordering the results that are necessary to identify which interests have been matched. In [15] and [16] , authors proposed protocols that attempt to overcome these issues. These protocols utilize trusted servers for the identity and interest verification of a user.
In [15] , authors use expensive Diffie-Hellman key exchange at the end of protocol to exchange matched interests in order to detect any cheating in previous steps. Also, they do not provide security against attacks where a malicious party sends garbage values instead of the commutative encryption of interests. In this case, the cheating party will know the number of matched interests while the honest party will know nothing. In [16] , authors extends the work by attempting to overcome the issues in previous approach. They also find the best match and combine the identity and interest verification server into a single server. However, their criterion of a best match only depends upon the number of matches. A candidate with most matches is considered to be the best match. In reality, a user may wish to know the matched interests in order to decide the best match. For example, Alice is more interested in football and less interested in movies and reading. If Bob has one match (football) with Alice and Charlie has two matches (movies and reading) then Bob is more likely a best match for Alice. Moreover, [16] also suffers with similar issues as in [15] . For example at the end of the protocol, in order to detect any cheating, VOLUME 4, 2016 Alice and Bob exchange their interests encrypted in each others' public key. Bob can easily learn Alice's interests by decrypting the message first, re-encrypting and sending the contents back in Alice's key and therefore pretending to Alice that they have same interests.
Our proposed PRISM is an improved and efficient protocol that uses same building blocks of commutative encryption as in [14] . As discussed above, it identifies various attacks on user's privacy during interests matching and interests revealing that have not been properly addressed in existing approaches [14] - [16] . PRISM provides effective protection against these attacks without assuming strong trust assumptions on TTP.
III. PRELIMINARIES
This section includes the attack model, design goals, system model, assumptions, notations and the cryptographic tool used in PRISM.
A. ATTACK MODEL PRISM considers both the active and passive attacks. A passive attack can be described as the eavesdropping by an intruder that does not involve message modification. An active attack is launched by an attacker with more capabilities that include modifying, replaying or re-transmitting of messages. Active attacks also include impersonation and man-in-the-middle attacks. We also consider the semi-honest users also termed as honest-but-curious users. These users follow the protocol but are curious to learn more information than allowed such as key information or encrypted interests. While the two parties are running a matchmaking protocol, one of them could try to learn more information about the other party while showing only a subset of interests. Therefore, in our protocol both initiator and respond can assure the role of an attacker with above mentioned capabilities.
B. DESIGN GOALS
Our design goals are as follows:
• The initiator along with each of the candidates should only know the intersection set between them mutually. Any information other than the matched interests should not be known to any other party.
• Trust assumption should be kept to a minimum. Therefore, a TTP server should only verify the number of interests and knows nothing about the actual interests.
• There should be an upper bound for the number of interests that are verified by an identity verifier. A user should not use more interests than a threshold.
• During matchmaking, none of the user should get any unfair advantage over the other. This includes attacks where a user may place gibberish values to be matched in order to get an unfair advantage.
• On a positive match, both the parties should reveal only their matched interests to each other in such a way that neither of them should be able to get an advantage. The protocol should be able to prevent this kind of attack.
• The protocol should also provide prevention from Sybil attacks. That is, a malicious user should not be able to run the protocol multiple times against a user in order to find the interests set.
C. SYSTEM MODEL
There are three participants in our system model as described below: 1) Identity verifier (IdV ): verifies a legitimate user's identification as well as upper limit of his number of interests. It also initializes the system parameters and in case of a complaint, acts as a dispute resolver and takes necessary action to revoke the malicious user. 2) Initiator: initiates the protocol by sending interests to other users. 3) Responder: is the user who replies initiator's request by sending his interests for matchmaking. Initiator and responder exchange information with each other and with IdV . For simplicity, we call initiator as Alice and responding user as Bob.
D. ASSUMPTIONS
PRISM is based on following assumptions.
• IdV is honest-but-curious and can be trusted keeping a user's identity safe. However, we do not consider the complaint against a malicious activity as a normal scenario. Therefore in order to investigate, the IdV may ask the participants of the protocol for their credentials.
• The matchmaking protocol, once started, terminates only after its completion.
• Users keep their security parameters safe during the protocol.
• We do not assume any collusion among the IdV and the users.
E. NOTATIONS
The notations used in PRISM are mentioned in Table 1 .
. It implies that if m is encrypted with a secret key and the resultant ciphertext is encrypted again by another secret key then changing the order of the decryption keys will not have any effect on the result. Therefore,
IV. OUR PROPOSED PRISM PROTOCOL
This section explains proposed PRISM protocol in detail.
A. GENERATION OF USER IDENTITIES
In previous protocols, it is possible to create many identities using any social network site. Although these sites attempt to restrict a user to have a single identity associated by some unique credentials such as an email or phone number, but in real life it is very hard to detect a violation. We suggest the idea of restricting a user to have at most one identity on a device. We argue that a Sybil attack with as many devices as number of identities is very hard to prevent. A realistic approach can be to restrict a user to use only one identity on a single device.
In this regard, PRISM proposes the use of either the unique international mobile station equipment identity (IMEI) number of a device, which can be retrieved during implementation of protocol through getDeviceId() in android [17] or ANDROID_ID [18] in Android SDK. However, many operating systems such as Apple iOS 7 and Windows have stopped giving IMEI information to application vendors for privacy concerns. In this case we suggest to use identifierForVendor [19] in iOS 7 or later (an application specific unique identifier) and DeviceUniqueID [20] for Windows (which is a unique value per device and per application).
Instead of using email identity or social network based identities, PRISM uses above mentioned application and device specific identities. The identity verifier (IdV ) will take this value from the user, hash it, digitally sign it with its private key and sends this back to the user as his unique identity. For simplicity we will refer the device identity as UID in the rest of the paper. The memory size for this light weight identity will be 20 bytes hash of UID, 4 bytes timestamps and 64 bytes of signature (we are supporting an ECC key of IdV ), i.e. 88 bytes in total.
B. USE OF DUMMY INTERESTS
One of the main contributions of this work is the proposed method of using dummy interests in order to prevent the attacks that were present in earlier approaches. The detailed analysis of this concept has been presented in section V-A. In this section, a brief explanation of the concept is presented in order to facilitate the reader about the key ideas. A dummy interest is a known interest to both the parties A and B and provides prevention from cheating attacks as mentioned in section V-C. The dummy values are sent from initiator party (Alice) to the responder party (Bob) in plain text along with their associated encrypted values as well as other normal encrypted interests. Note that the indices in the set of encrypted interests are shuffled and only sender knows what interest is on what index position in the set. In order to perform an attack, Bob needs not only to find the index position of the dummy interests but their values as well. As provided in section V-A, the probability of carrying out such attacks is very low and that makes our scheme resilient to such attacks.
C. WORKING OF PRISM
PRISM consists of three phases (1) initial setup phase, (2) matchmaking phase and (3) interests revealing phase. Following are the details of these phases.
1) INITIAL SETUP PHASE
First of all, the IdV generates and publishes system parameters. In commutative encryption such as RSA cryptosystem, all the users should have these parameters. The IdV choses two large prime integers p and q at random and computes modulus n = p * q, as well as φ(n) = (p − 1) * (q − 1). IdV does not store the values of p and q due to security reasons. After getting the system parameters, Alice generates a public private key pair and sends her public key to IdV along with identity UID and maximum number of interests max Alice that are intended to be used in matchmaking. IdV computes the hash of UID and digitally signs it along with a timestamp T as user's unique identity. T is the expiration time of this identity and provides a second line of defense against a cheating user as explained in section V-B.
The value of T describes the length of the time after which a user needs to renew its user ID. In PRISM, we propose that a user keeps a small database of user IDs against which the user has performed matchmaking. With a moderate value of T for example a day or may be a week, the user will only require to store the entries in the database for a small period of time, for example one month. If we consider that a user runs the matchmaking protocol with 100 users a day on average, then he/she needs to store 3000 users identities in a month. With the memory consumptions of 88 bytes for one user identity, the user roughly requires a mere 260 kilobytes (KB) for device storage. After generating Alice's unique identity, IdV also signs public key of Alice as well as max Alice (if it is in acceptable range) and sends these values back to Alice along with her unique identity as shown in Fig. 1 . For the remaining of the paper, we will denote (h(UID Alice )||T ) SK IdV and (max Alice ) SK IdV as the signed identity and signed number of interests of Alice respectively.
Furthermore, IdV maintains a database of each user's identity along with corresponding max and the public key as shown in Table 2 . If a user is found guilty of a wrong doing, the IdV will block that user. It should be noted that in case Alice needs to change the value of max Alice at a later time, she will request the new value max Alice to the IdV . Finally, Alice generates a 1024 bits random secret exponent a chosen from modulus n, and subsequently encrypts each of her interests by exponentiating with a. Similarly, Bob or any other participant performs the above mentioned steps before matchmaking.
After the initialization phase, Alice and Bob become eligible to start the matchmaking protocol. Alice sends her interests to the responder in order to find the matched interests.
2) MATCHMAKING PHASE
This paper proposes the novel idea to use k known dummy interests. These dummy interests are suggested by the initiator and need to be included in the interest set of both parties.
In section V, we show the effectiveness of the use of dummy interests.
At the start of matchmaking, Alice chooses k dummy interest values. It is worth mentioning that these values are not necessary to be meaningful. Alice also encrypts these values by exponentiating them with her secret value a and includes these values in her interests set A i at random indices. Following are the steps of our matchmaking protocol that are also shown in Fig. 2 .
Step 1: Alice prepares a matchmaking request that includes her exponentiated interests set A a i , k dummy interests in plaintext, her identity (h(UID Alice )||T ) SK IdV , her signed public key (PK Alice ) SK IdV and (max Alice ) SK IdV . Alice then signs the entire message with her secret key and sends this to Bob.
Step •
Step 3: After exchanging these messages, both parties verify each other's signatures. In the next step, Alice and Bob exponentiate each other's interests commutatively with their secret values a, b respectively.
• Alice computes ∀i ∈ (0, n
Step 4: Alice pairs together each of Bob's encrypted interest values and the corresponding commutative encryption. She then takes the hash of these values, signs it and sends to Bob as her commitment.
Step 5: Bob pairs together each of Alice's encrypted interest value and the corresponding commutative encryption, signs it and sends to Alice.
Step 6: After receiving this message, Alice sends Bob the actual values of commitment.
Step 7: Both Alice and Bob compare the intersection respectively in order to find the number of matches.
• Alice computes ∀i ∈ (0, m
3) INTERESTS REVEALING PHASE
Due to the possible cheats, (discussed in section V), Alice and Bob exchange their matched interests in order to make it sure that both parties have exactly same matches. It is interesting to note that if both Alice and Bob honestly follow the protocol then there will be exactly same number of matches and therefore none of them have cheated. However, in case anyone of them cheats, the mismatching in the interests will reveal any cheating attempt. It is worth mentioning that after step 7, Alice and Bob must have exactly same and equal number of matches. Either they do not have any matched interests or they must have equal number of matches with same interest values. Let p be the number of matched interests at Alice's side and q be the number of matched interests at Bob's side. As mentioned above, p and q are matched interests at both sides and if there is no cheating then p and q must match exactly. It is interesting to note that both Alice and Bob do not know other's matched values.
All they know is their calculated values (p in case of Alice and q in case of Bob). Being honest assures Alice as well as
Bob that the other value should be same as theirs. The steps from 8 through 11 assure an honest exchange of their values p and q respectively. If anyone has cheated by the end of step 7, the cheating will be exposed when two parties exchange their matched interests at the end of step 11.
Step 8: Alice generates a random secret n 1 , concatenates her interests that are matched with Bob in alphabetical order, hashes it, prepares (h(A i ) ⊕ n 1 ) and sends it to Bob as a commitment. The use of n 1 assures that Bob cannot guess Alice's interests by repeatedly taking hash of all possible interests, n 2 serves the same purpose for Bob.
• ∀i ∈ (0, p] (h(A i ) ⊕ n 1 )
Step 9: Similarly Bob generates n 2 , computes (h(B i ) ⊕ n 2 ) and sends this to Alice.
• ∀i ∈ (0, q] (h(B i ) ⊕ n 2 )
Step 10: Next both parties exchange n 1 and n 2 and find h(A i ), h(B i ) respectively.
Step 11: Both parties check whether h(A i ) == h(B i ). If yes, the matchmaking is successful, else the victim sends the protocol recordings to IdV . IdV asks the involved participants for a, b, (A i ) a and (B i ) b and compares these values with the recordings. After that, IdV erases a, b, (A i ) a and (B i ) b from its temporary storage in order to keep the privacy of the honest party. Due to the fact that a cheating attempt will be detected immediately, user devices will not be needed to keep the recordings of protocol for long.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
This section presents a comprehensive analysis of PRISM. Firstly, we provide the proof of the concept. Secondly, we analyze the security of PRISM under both the passive and active threats that also include honest-nut-curious attackers and finally we compare the security and privacy features of PRISM against other similar approaches in order to prove its effectiveness.
A. PROOF OF CONCEPT
PRISM introduces the concept of using dummy interests that are known to both participants. At first, these dummies seem to increase protocol cost in terms of processing, communication and storage. However, by carefully analyzing the protocol, it is evident that not only these dummies comprise a small fraction of actual interest but also play a pivotal role in the security and privacy of PRISM. Moreover, it should be noted that in order to launch a successful attack (active attack scenario 3 & 4) , Bob has to identify all dummy interests. That is, in case Alice detects a single malicious pairing of (A i ) a ,((A j ) a ) b for some interests i where i = j (where A i is i th interest of Alice), Bob's cheating will be exposed. If Bob tries an attack that includes only a subset of the interests then due to random distribution of dummies in the interest set, it is highly unlikely that Bob can successfully guess the current index as well as the correct values of dummy interests.
Let A is Alice's interest set, n is the total number of interests in A and k denotes the dummy interests in A. Let's suppose Bob is an attacker who needs to identify the dummies among n exponentiated interests of Alice.
Let k 1 , k 2 , ...., k m denotes increasing number of dummy interests, starting from a single dummy interest to a maximum value of m. The probability of finding a single dummy value among n total interests can be given as:
However, to launch a successful attack Bob needs to identify them all, that includes correctly guessing the index position as well as the correct value of dummy interests. Therefore, in case of two dummy interests k 1 and k 2 , the conditional probability of attack can be given as:
For k = 3:
and similarly for m dummy interests Fig. 3 shows probabilities of identifying the increasing values of dummy interests from 1 to 10. The total number of interests are from 20 to 60. It can be clearly seen that the probability to correctly identifying 5 dummy interests and subsequently replacing them with correct values among 40 interests is around 10 −6 . In reality, the total number of interests can be more than 60. An increasing number of total interests (and therefore a lower fraction of dummy interests) will lower the probability of successful attack even more.
B. PASSIVE ATTACKS
By passive attacks we mean those attacks where an adversary tries to eavesdrop the communication and tries to infer identity and key information, or runs the protocol again and again with varying number of interests set. We explain the passive attacks with the help of following scenarios:
Scenario 1: In PRISM, if an adversary launches an attack by eavesdropping the encrypted communication in order to learn a user's interests' values.
Solution: Each user's interests are encrypted with some key a. Agrawal et al. [14] has proved that given a value x and the encryption f a (x) but not the key a, one cannot compute f (x) −1 . That is, f a (x) is irreversible without knowing the value of a.
Scenario 2: If a user shows honest but curious behavior and try to learn key information by honestly following the protocol.
Solution: A user exponentiates her interests with her secret value such as A a i where A i is the i th interest while a is the secret value. In [14] agrawal et al. has proved that f a (x) is irreversible without knowing the value of a i.e. unless the key a is compromised one cannot compute f (x) −1 .
Scenario 3: Consider an attacker that forms a larger number of interests set (including fake interests) against an honest user. There is a high probability that the attacker's large number of interests will eventually result in positive match with the honest user and that will reveal those interests to the attacker.
Solution: PRISM prevents such types of attacks by putting a limit on the number of interests a user can use. By setting the value of max and subsequently getting it signed by IdV , the user cannot use more than max interests. Unlike [15] and [16] , this prevention is provided without revealing the interests to the server, while [14] does not consider such attacks.
Scenario 4: Consider an attacker who tries to know other user's interests by running the protocol against a user again and again with varying interests set that eventually results in a successful match. 
Solution:
We prevent such attacks by the use of a signed user identity such as (h(UID)||T ) SK Idv in PRISM. This identity is stored in a user's device database and is checked in order to prevent another user attempting to run the protocol again with the same user. Once T expires, a user needs to register this UID again with the server. Therefore, the revoked user will be unable to get his UID registered by server again. The approaches in [15] and [16] prevent this attack on expense of limiting an honest user not been able to change his interests.
C. ACTIVE ATTACKS
Some of the attacks mentioned in this section can be launched by an honest-but-curious user. Other attacks may require a more advance adversary, who is capable of deviating from the protocol and maliciously manipulate users' interests. These attacks also include impersonation attack, man-in-the-middle attack and Sybil attack etc.
Scenario 1: An attacker can create multiple IDs and launch a Sybil attack with different identities.
Solution: We easily thwart these kinds of attack by suggesting the use of the device identity parameters such as IMEI or application identifiers unique to a particular device/OS as mentioned in section 4.1. This is a major improvement over the methods utilized by [15] and [16] where they suggest using the social media based identities.
Scenario 2: A trusted server knows a user's interests. In case of a compromise, all users' privacy will be compromised.
Solution: One of the most significant improvement of PRISM over [15] and [16] is not disclosing the actual attribute values to the server and thus greatly enhancing the user's privacy. While [15] and [16] fully trust the server by disclosing their interests, our scheme neither trusts nor discloses any useful information to the server. Therefore, in case of a server compromise, no interests information is revealed to the attacker. The server only learns the number of interests of a user but not the actual interests. In case of a complaint, the IdV does not ask for a user's interests but the encrypted interests and the keys. It does not store these values in a database and therefore, in case of a compromise, an attacker won't be able to get any useful information.
Scenario 3: In step 5, if Bob maliciously puts together pairs
Solution: Let's suppose Bob is malicious and Alice is honest. Bob maliciously pairs together and sends (A i ) a , ((A j ) a ) b for some interests i where i = j. However, if Bob's pairing include some (A i ) a where that A i is a dummy interest then Alice will detect this attack. This is due to the fact that for all(A i ) a , where A i is a dummy interest, the corresponding ((A j ) a ) b must have a match with some ((B i ) b ) a . However, if Bob gets lucky and avoids pairing such value of A i in pair ( (A i ) a , ((A j ) a ) b ), then this cheating will be detected at the final step. By getting lucky we mean the negligible chance of success as shown in Fig. 3 A i ) a ) b with gibberish values, then Alice will easily detect this attack. This is due to the presence of dummy interests. The only way for Bob to make this attack successful is to correctly predict all the (A i ) a where A i is a dummy interest. However, section V-A clearly shows that Bob only have a negligible chance of success. Any such attempt of cheating by Alice will be detected similarly. The protocols [14] - [16] do not provide any protection against this attack.
Scenario 5: In the interest revealing phase, if any user is able to know the interests of the other before revealing his own interests then cheating is possible.
Solution: Let's suppose Bob is malicious and Alice is honest. In interests revealing phase, both Alice and Bob need to arrange the matched interests in alphabetical order and then they take the hash. After that they take XOR (Exclusive or) of the hash with a secret n 1 and n 2 respectively and exchange the results. These results have no meaning until Alice and Bob exchange their respective values of n 1 and n 2 . Therefore, Bob or Alice cannot know other's interest before showing their own interests. The commitment sent by Alice and Bob earlier in Step 8 & 9 ensures that they must send the same values of n 1 and n 2 respectively. The solution provided in [15] uses a shared key for interests exchange, while in [16] , both parties encrypt their interests in each other's public key and, therefore, do not provide effective protection against this attack. The approach in [14] does not consider such attack. Table 3 provides a comparison of PRISM with [14] - [16] in terms of protection against various privacy attacks. The approaches in [14] - [16] are all based on commutative encryption and are similar to our work. It is worth mentioning that, we only present the comparison against active attacks mentioned in section V-C. This is because the security of passive attack scenarios 1 and 2, as mentioned in section 5.2, is based on DDH. Xie and Hengartner [15] and Wang [16] use the trust assumptions on TTP in order to provide security against passive attacks scenario 3 and 4 while [14] does not consider such attacks.
D. COMPARISON WITH EXISTING APPROACHES

VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
This section provides the performance evaluation of PRISM that includes computational cost analysis, communicational cost analysis and experimental results.
A. IMPLEMENTATION
We implement PRISM on an Intel i7 CPU with 8 GB of RAM. In order to get average execution time we ran the experiment for 500 times. We compare the performance of PRISM with approaches presented in [15] and [16] . Moreover, it is worth mentioning that as mentioned in [15] and [16] , the execution time of [14] is better due to less number of protocol steps. However, it does not provide mutual interests revealing to both parties and only initiator learns the matched interests. Moreover, [14] is prone to various attacks due to this lack of mutual revealing of interests. 4 shows execution time of PRISM with varying number of interests ranging from 20 to 60 against a single candidate. For each of the number of interests, we assume a similar value of 5 dummy interests. The graph shows that PRISM is better than [15] . This is due to the fact that [15] uses Diffie-Hellman key exchange in order to share the matched interests. The execution time of [16] is slightly better than PRISM. This is because, this consumption is only based on interaction with a single user. One PKI operation performs slightly better than our proposed exchange of hashes and nonce for interest revealing. However, as the number of users grow, the performance of our protocol in interest revealing phase increased with significant advantage on [16] as shown in Fig. [5] . to 30. The number of interests and number of dummy interests were fixed to 60 and 5 respectively. The graph shows that PRISM outperforms [15] due to the use of Diffie-Hellman by [15] . However, PRISM is taking almost similar time with [16] . It is worth mentioning here that, as mentioned earlier, [16] only exchange the matched interests with the best match and therefore, does not exchange matched interests with all the candidates. Therefore, for multiple users, [16] uses one (or few, in case of multiple best matches) expensive PKI encryptions and decryptions. The novel use of hash, in order to share and confirm the matched interests with all the candidates, enables PRISM to execute fast and use dummy interests for more protection without any significant increase in computational cost. We consider it a big advantage that a user selects best match by knowing the actual values of matched interests and not by knowing only the number of matches as in [16] . Table. 4 shows the complexity analysis of PRISM along with the existing approaches. PM denotes the power modulations while DH stands for Diffie-Hellman. In computational analysis we can see that [15] uses expensive DH while [16] uses PKI . However, PRISM avoids these expensive exchange mechanisms. The extra cost of 2k (where k is the number of dummy interests) is negligible considering the small value of k.
B. COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
The communication complexity shows that PRISM is slightly more expensive than both [15] and [16] . This is mainly due to the use of dummy interests. However, by considering the fact that PRISM provides much more resilience against the existing approaches, this little overhead can be neglected in practice. 
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have presented an efficient privacy protection and interest sharing protocol in mobile social networks. We have provided novel attacks scenarios and their efficient solution. Unlike existing approaches, PRISM does not require a user to reveal interests to a trusted third party and only uses it as an identity verifier and conflict resolver. The proposed use of unique identity for a user helps prevent Sybil attacks. With the help of implementation we show the feasibility of PRISM. Moreover, with a comprehensive security and complexity analyses, we show the robustness of PRISM against various attacks as well as its efficiency.
In the future, we intend to further enhance the security of the PRISM by not relying on the suggestion to use platform/application specific prevention from attacks such as Sybil attack and multiple runs of protocol against a user. We aim to integrate this prevention in PRISM by proposing an encryption based mechanism. We also plan to improve the efficiency of PRISM by developing an application and testing it on a smart phone. 
